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Abstract: Companies making initial public offerings in Greece were obliged to include next year‟s profit 
in the new issue prospectuses until the regulations changed to voluntary status. This study takes 
advantage of these two regulatory regimes and compares the accuracy of earnings forecasts under both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure environments. Findings indicate behavioural change, as pessimistic 
earnings forecasts during the mandatory era turn optimistic in the voluntary period. The comparison of 
these two regimes suggests that mandatory earnings forecasts can force firms to forecast that have neither 
the incentives nor the ability to do so. Instead, the results imply that regulations penalizing IPOs for 
providing highly inaccurate forecasts appear to be a more appropriate regulatory strategy. Accuracy of 
earnings improves after the introduction of voluntary disclosures where firms that provide forecasts are 
characterized as mature, with high demand multiple and low retained ownership.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Initial Public Offerings need approval from the Securities Commission before going public. The 
Securities Commission, in considering the proposal for entering the stock exchange, takes into account 
the overall suitability of the company undertaking the IPO. Once approved, the company is required to 
issue a prospectus outlining the history, operations and the accounts of the firm and how it has fared and 
expects to perform in the future. The amount of information that can be found in a prospectus is immense 
but one aspect has attracted special research interest based on the rational investor‟s decisions to 
subscribe for new shares offerings. This is the management earnings forecast figure and its quality as 
indicated by its accuracy.   
Earnings management is an accounting phenomenon where managers use judgment to structure 
transactions and or financial reporting to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers or to provide a wrong presentation of the economic performance of a company (see 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), Ghikas et al (2008), Chapman and Steenburgh (2011)). This phenomenon in 
relation to the disclosure of IPO management earnings forecasts is of great interest in the Greek market 
because of its unique regulatory switch from mandatory to voluntary forecasts disclosure at a time that all 
other developed markets allow for voluntary disclosure. As Ball and Shivakumar (2008) note, studies of 
earnings management around the time of initial public offerings (IPOs) is important because it examines 
regulatory and market effects on financial reporting quality by isolating the change in regulatory and 
market environment that occurs when a firm changes its status from private to public. This motive mainly 
stems from the hypothesis that listed companies meet a higher reporting standard due to regulatory 
incentives and enhanced market demand by public-company financial statement users such as investors 
and lenders who request higher quality reporting to counter information asymmetry.  
Issuing firms can reduce the level of information asymmetry and uncertainty by signaling IPO 
quality through various mechanisms such as retaining a large proportion of ownership by insiders (owners 
and managers) in the post IPO period, Hughes (1986), Datar et al., (1991) and Li and McConomy  (2004),  
appointing high quality auditors (Beatty (1989), Ritter (2002), Ghikas et al., (2008) and using highly 
reputable investment bankers as underwriters (Beatty and Ritter (1986), Clarkson et al.(1992), Jog and 
McConomy (2003), Jo et al. (2007)). To mitigate the costs of information asymmetries caused by 
information uncertainty, market participants
1, and regulatory bodies‟ insist on the disclosure of additional 
                                               
1 Baber et al (2006) suggest that market participants are aware of incentives to manage reported earnings, and accordingly, they 
adjust for earnings management when they are provided the information required to do so. 
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material information and voluntary
2
 earnings forecast during the IPO process. Under voluntary earnings 
forecast environment each company should consider carefully whether to make an earnings forecast 
announcement in the prospectus. If the decision turns positive then the first priority will be to spend large 
amount of money in order to make sure they will provide an accurate figure. In the decision turns 
negative then management will signal to the market that the firm is of a low quality (see Firth et al, 
(1995), Firth (1998), Jaggi, (1997), Pedwell et al. (1994), Chan et al, (1996), Chen and Firth, (1999), 
Chen et al. (2001) and Baber et al. (2006)).  
It is difficult to monitor regulatory and underlying market effects by studying public firms in a 
single country, as there is little variation in their regulatory and market environment. A common solution 
is to study international variation in the regulatory and market regimes (see Leuz et al. (2003),and Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008). A superior solution is to concentrate on a country that has experienced changes 
in its regulations because there is an opportunity to explore the effects of the regulation changes using a 
homogeneous sample.   
Motivated by the importance of earnings forecasts, as pointed out in recent studies, the objective 
of this research is to evaluate the usefulness of earnings forecast disclosures to investors. Previous 
literature on the disclosure in the offering prospectus has focused on managerial earnings forecasts alone 
(Clarkson et al., (1992), Jog and McConomy, (2003)), on the number of risk factors listed and discussed, 
Clarkson (1994), on the use of the IPO proceeds without providing proprietary information to competitors 
(Beatty and Ritter (1986), Babich and Sobel (2004), Leone et al. (2007)) or in relation with other 
forecasts such as detailed revenues and expense estimates, planned capital expenditure and multi period 
forecasts earnings.  
This study differs from previous evidence on earnings forecasts disclosure in IPOs on several 
major points. First we document management earnings forecast under two different regulatory regimes 
(mandatory and voluntary) in the same market. Uniquely we make a direct comparison of management 
earnings forecast accuracy on a sample of IPOs that were obliged to provide earnings forecast (mandatory 
status) with a sample of IPOs that had the choice to announce earnings forecast based on their ability to 
make accurate forecasts (voluntary status). We are going to learn from studying this move by the Greek 
Authorities whether the change to voluntary status is an efficient strategy or if the mandatory regime was 
working better for IPOs and should be reversed. Our findings shed light on a number of issues that have 
not been addressed in the past. They include the amount of improvement in the accuracy of earnings 
forecast with the introduction of voluntary forecasts, the trend of the forecast (i.e. optimistic – 
pessimistic) after the regime change and any potential connection with self selection theory, the number 
                                               
2 Within the context of contracting theory and in line with Cormier and Martinez (2006) we characterize voluntary forecast 
disclosure as a reporting environment where managers may be pressured to engage in earnings management in the year following 
the IPO. 
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of firms feeling confident to provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses after the regulatory change, 
the comparative characteristics which appears after the creation of the two samples and the amendments 
IPOs have to make in order to provide this crucial investor information. Our results have major 
implications on how financial market valuation affects corporate actions and managerial behavior, in 
particular the managerial incentive to make accurate forecasted earnings (see Teoh et al. (1998), 
Abarbanell and Lehavy, (2003), Fischer and Stocken (2004), Gupta et al. (2008), Kao et al. (2009), Chi 
and Gupta (2009)). 
Second, there have been few studies
3
 covering mandatory forecast of earnings. This disclosure 
environment allows investors to search how accurately a firm can provide this figure and decide whether 
to subscribe to the offered shares after assessing the company‟s potential performance. Therefore, 
comparing to countries with voluntary supplied forecasts the big advantage of mandatory disclosure is 
that it helps investors to expose low quality IPOs and separate them from promising firms. Low quality 
IPOs are exposed under mandatory forecasts as they have neither the ability nor the incentive to provide 
accurate forecasts. In contrast their poor quality can be hidden behind the „choice‟ option that the 
voluntarily method creates. Additionally mandatory disclosure helps some good firms that otherwise 
would be reluctant to reveal their forecast earnings under the voluntary method to signal their quality by 
providing an accurate figure. Overall, the mandatory status in Greece for new firms to provide 
management earnings forecasts in their prospectuses provides a unique opportunity for the ongoing 
debate on the usefulness of the management earnings forecasts in the market valuation of IPOs. 
Third, prior evidence generally focus on earnings forecasts disclosure in IPOs conducted in high 
(Canada, France, US, UK) and low (New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) litigation environments. 
This study concentrates on a country characterized by a low litigation environment where financial 
market characteristics reduce the benefits of forecast disclosures and consequently the norm is for IPO 
firms not to disclose managerial earnings forecasts. In an environment where earnings forecast benefits 
can be underestimated we are attracted to explore the accountability of this piece of information. The 
research is also important as earnings forecasts constitute the major valuation factor for Greek IPOs and 
so this is a useful study for both institutions and private investors by helping them to make future 
investment decisions on new issues.  
Finally despite the small market status of Greece this study includes one of the largest samples in 
the topic. The 305 IPOs used (220 IPOs listed in a mandatory and 85 IPOs listed in a voluntary disclosure 
environment) surpass samples of 161 IPOs by Jaggi (1997) in Hong Kong, 203 IPOs by Hartnett and 
Romcke (2000) for Australia, 64 IPOs by Roosenbloom et al (2003) for Netherlands, 175 by Firth and 
                                               
3
 Jaggi (1993) document that in countries other than New Zealand, forecast information is disclosed in IPOs on a voluntary basis. Voluntary 
disclosure countries include the UK, Australia, Singapore, and Korea. 
5 
 
Lonkani (2005) for Thailand, 118 by Cormier and Martinez (2006) and 89 IPOs by Cazavan-Jeny and 
Jeanjean (2007) for France. 
In addition, this study examines the determinants and consequences of forecast disclosures 
published at the time of IPOs. Our aim is to understand those determinants and examine their influence in 
forecasting financial statements and on forecast error. We also explore whether the forecast error, i.e. the 
difference between actual reported earnings and the expected earnings, is affected by the details of 
forecast information in the financial statements. Overall the incremental contribution of this study in the 
IPO and management earnings forecasts literature is the examination of the informational content of the 
regulatory change and the quality signal by newly listed firms to multiple user groups including market 
makers and investors, within an international driven framework. 
Our findings indicate that for the year following an Initial Public Offering, the magnitude of 
earnings management is much higher for „mandatory‟ firms than for „voluntary‟ firms. Results reveal 
change in the forecast attitude of managers as their pessimism during the mandatory period is converted 
to optimism during the voluntary period. Earnings accuracy appears to improve after the introduction of 
voluntary disclosure. Finally, large underpricing in the immediate aftermarket can be a signal for high 
absolute forecast error especially for IPOs listed under a mandatory disclosure regime. It becomes 
obvious that some managers are not able to hide their inability to provide an accurate earnings forecast so 
they underprice their issues in order to attract investors.    
 
2 Related Literature Review  
2.1. Prior Research  
Research on earnings forecasts have generally focused on forecasts disclosed by already listed firms (e.g.  
Pownall and Waymire (1989), Ruland et al. (1990), Hutton et al. (2003) while we concentrate on 
management profit forecast by IPOs in their prospectuses.  
The accuracy of earnings forecasts included in the initial public offerings (IPO) prospectuses 
have received significant attention from researchers all around the world because of its importance on the 
investors decisions, firm‟s value and security prices (Firth and Smith, (1992),  Firth, (1998), Keasey and 
McGuiness (2008)). Some examples include Australia, Lee et al. (1993), Canada, Pedwell et al. (1994), Li 
and McConomy (2004), China, Chen and Firth (1999)
4
, France, Cormier and Martinez (2006), Hong 
Kong, (Jaggi, (1997),  Cheng and Firth, (2000),  Chen et al., (2001)), Malaysia, Jelic et al. (1998), New 
                                               
4 Chen and Firth (1999) investigate the accuracy of the profit forecast and its relationship with IPO firm valuations for China 
IPOs. They use all IPOs made on the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SH) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZ) from 1991 to 
1996. The results show that profit forecasts are moderately accurate and they are better than time series extrapolations of 
historical profits.  Their paper also shows that profit forecasts are related to company valuations. 
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Zealand, Firth and Smith, (1992)
5
, Singapore, Firth et al. (1995)
6
, Thailand, Firth and Lonkani, (2005), 
and a comparison of the UK, Australia and New Zealand Keasey and McGuiness (1991).  
The accuracy and usefulness of IPO forecasts motivate several studies in many British 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, The United Kingdom 
and Hong Kong‟ but are uncommon in the USA7 where the very litigious environment make IPO 
companies reluctant to announce profit forecasts. The findings of these studies signals that while some 
IPOs have optimistic forecasts others have pessimistic forecasts.  
Evidence of the accuracy of management earnings reveals Absolute Forecast Errors (AFE) from 
as low as 10.4% by Firth (1998) for Singapore and 11% for UK by Keasey and McGuinness (1991)
8
 to an 
enormous 1,138% reported by Lee (1993) for Australia
9
. The later result attracted more research into the 
Australian case with Hartnett & Romcke (2000) reporting a high 88.29% AFE thereby indicating that the 
regulatory environment should become more strict in the case of Australian IPOs
10
. A similar outcome is 
observed by studies carried out in New Zealand with AFE varying from 100% in the study by Mak (1989) 
to 328% by Firth & Smith (1992). Clearly forecast errors in Australia and New Zealand are very large 
when compared to the errors in the UK and Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong IPOs receive special attention because earnings forecasts appear in something like 
40–50% of IPOs. This allows for a sufficient number of both disclosing and non-disclosing firms to 
feature in any assessment of the potential signaling role of this key decision variable. Chan et al. (1996), 
Jaggi (1997), Cheng and Firth (2000) and Chen et al. (2001) studies for Hong Kong all point out mean 
forecast errors at higher levels than the more recent study by McGuinness (2005) who reports absolute 
                                               
5 Firth and Smith (1992) examine the accuracy of profit forecasts contained in prospectuses of companies newly issued on the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange. They find that the level of forecast accuracy appears to be poor in comparison to studies..   
6 Firth, et al. (1995) re-examined the accuracy of profit forecasts contained in 114 IPOs issued by Singapore companies from 
1980 to 1993, and also evaluated whether the company-specific characteristics had any impact on the forecast accuracy. Their 
findings indicated that the IPOs of Singapore companies exhibited comparatively higher forecast accuracy than that reported for 
IPOs issued for other commonwealth countries 
7 Despite the usefulness of this information, US companies rarely disclose it because the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) does not require it. 
8
 Keasey and McGuinness (1991) examined the pricing aspect of the shares offered by UK companies. In this study, the authors 
also re-evaluated the accuracy of forecasts contained in 121 IPOs issued from 1984 to 1986. Their results indicated that 109 
forecasts exhibited positive errors compared to only 12 negative errors, and the mean of forecast errors was only 5 percent. These 
positive forecast errors suggested that the forecasts were conservative instead of being optimistic. The mean absolute forecast 
error was only 11 percent. The comparison of IPO forecasts with naive model forecasts did not show any significant difference 
between the accuracy of IPO forecasts and model forecasts. 
9 The accuracy of Australian forecasts has been examined by Lee, et al. (1993). Their findings indicated that the IPO forecasts 
were highly inaccurate; the mean absolute forecast error was as high as 1138.3%. But the median forecast error was 
comparatively small, i.e. 42%, which indicated that the mean forecast error was influenced by the extreme values of certain 
negative forecast errors. Their findings also indicated that the forecasts were overly optimistic, with the mean forecast. 
10 Hartnett and Romcke (2000) summarize nine IPO studies conducted between 1972 and 1994 and find that these studies used 13 
error determinants, which are: age, SZ, forecast interval, macroeconomic conditions, industry conditions, float year, leverage, 
auditing quality, underwriter quality, growth prospect, earnings volatility, equity retained and type of issue. Theykl use seven of 
these variables and add four other variables, which are: float motive, subscription price premium, range of activities and 
international exposure. Their results show that revenues forecasts are more accurate than EFs, and 60 per cent of revenue 
forecasts and 40 per cent of EFs are within 10 per cent of the actual results. 
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forecast earnings errors of 3.60% in relation to the estimates and 7.26% in relation to real forecasts. 
Interestingly, none of the estimates or real forecasts proved to be conservative forecasts of subsequent 
earnings disclosures. Finally Keasey and McGuinness (2008) find interaction among the signals relating 
to forecast earnings disclosure and retained equity in the Hong Kong market. 
There have been a number of theories that shed light on the inefficiencies that exist in the IPO 
market. Hughes (1986) initially reports informational asymmetry between investors and the issuer of an 
initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid market failure, Hughes suggests the issuer 
makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker. To succeed this she set up a 
bivariate signaling model and derives testable implications from comparative statics analysis. Consistent 
with Hughes (1986) bivariate signaling model Li and McConomy (2004) empirically test the substitution 
effect hypothesis and show that retained ownership and the provision of management earnings forecasts 
are credible value-relevant signals. Their analysis indicates that managers' choices of the earnings forecast 
and retained ownership signals are jointly determined after controlling for other factors that affect each 
decision independently and that a substitution effect exists among managers' choices. 
Regulatory authorities mainly worry about the accuracy of forecasts included in the IPO 
prospectuses, as forecasts are the only basic form of information available to investors. Accurate 
forecasting is a demanding task, especially when it is prepared by newly established companies that lack 
historical data and prior experience (Firth (1998)). Also, forecasts are affected by external factors that are 
out of the control of the firm such as currency exchange rates, political climate, oil prices, inflation and so 
on. Brown et al. (1987) report that ex-ante uncertainty of the forecast will increase by any sudden change 
in these external factors. Lee et al. (1993) report that changes in external factors are the excuse that 
management usually use to explain their failure to achieve the forecasted targets. 
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of management absolute forecast error at the 
time of IPOs but almost all of it are in commonwealth countries (Firth and Smith, (1992); Jaggi (1997); 
Jelic et al. (1998); Cheng and Firth (2000) among others).
11
 There is limited empirical evidence on 
variables affecting earnings forecast information in the IPOs and less that also originate from countries 
out of the commonwealth countries block. Exceptions are the studies by Chen and Firth (1999) for China, 
Firth and Lonkani (2005) for Thailand, Cormier and Martinez (2006) and Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean 
(2007) for France. Few prior studies have concentrated on the forecaster/non-forecaster dichotomy and its 
relationship to future performance (Jaggi and Grier, (1980)). Moreover no existing study investigates the 
association between mandatory vs voluntary forecast disclosure and their associated earnings forecast 
error. 
                                               
11 Jaggi, (1997), Cheng and Firth, (2000), Hartnett and Romcke (2000) have examined the association between the forecast 
accuracy and the firm‟s characteristics such as the retained equity (REQ), auditor‟s reputation (AUD) and size (SZ). The results 
of these studies are mixed regarding the significance of some of the characteristics. 
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2.2. Regulatory Switch  
It was obvious back in 2000 that Greece would abandon the Drahma and join the Euro with many 
other countries of the European Union. This provided a great opportunity for the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission to reconsider a number of regulations and to harmonize them with other countries joining the 
new currency. One of those regulations was the mandatory vs voluntary disclosure basis for prospectus 
forecasts. In contrast to other countries in the Euro zone, Greece required disclosure of earnings forecasts. 
Newly listed firms were complaining about compliance costs and about their inability to provide accurate 
management earnings forecasts.  
The regulatory switch from mandatory to voluntary management earnings forecasts was 
motivated by its supposed contribution to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the capital 
market. The protection of investors and the maintenance of confidence in the Greek financial market were 
also important issues. This regulatory change was also intended to reinforce the freedom of movement of 
capital in the internal market and to help small family companies to go public. 
It is clear that the regulatory switch from mandatory to voluntary disclosure of management 
earnings forecast was inspired by and looking forward to the introduction of the more strict international 
accounting standards (IAS). IAS require three tests of any regulation, firstly that it meets the basic 
requirement of the Council Directives, that is to say that its application results in a true and fair view of 
the financial position and performance of an enterprise, secondly that, in accordance with the conclusions 
of the Council of 17 July 2000, it is conducive to the European public good and thirdly that it meets basic 
criteria as to the quality of information required for financial statements, specifically that it is useful to 
users. It becomes transparent that inaccurate forecasts under the mandatory forecast regime would be a 
major problem for the trustworthiness of Greek IPOs.   
 
3 Data, Methodology and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Sample and summary statistics 
The sample consists of 305 IPOs that occurred during the 1993 to 2009 time period. A great effort is 
made to collect the data involving all the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange ASE during this 
period except for insurance and investment companies. Thus a variety of sources are used to make sure 
we have the maximum amount of information. Those sources include Bloomberg, Compustat, Datastream 
and Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation. Firms are included in the sample if the following 
items are available: a prospectus, financial statements for the year prior to the offering, forecast profits 
before tax and stock prices for at least 36 months or 756 trading days following the IPO for all years 
except for IPOs listed during 2007 where we have a minimum of 504 trading days following the listing.  
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Historical accounting information is derived from published financial statements at the end of 
fiscal year t–1. The institutional framework has been well described in the Greek Presidential Decree No. 
348 of 1985 and can be seen in Ghicas et al. (2000). The great majority of information used in this study 
is hand collected from prospectuses, annual reports and publicly available financial statements. Stock 
prices, market returns and the Athens Stock Exchange General Index (ASEGI) are retrieved from the ASE 
database. The share prices and prices of the General A.S.E. Index are collected during the first three years 
of trading in the market. Market returns are measured for 756 trading days subsequent to the IPO. 
Appropriate adjustments are made for stock splits and stock dividends. 
Information related to variables affecting earnings forecast (i.e., market capitalization of the IPOs 
by the time it goes public, the operating history of the firm prior to going public, time period between the 
offer price day and the first day of trading, demand multiple on the number of shares issued and the 
proportion of retained ownership by the initial shareholders) comes from the IPO prospectus. Forecasted 
earnings for the forecast year t are also retrieved from the IPO prospectus and crosschecked with the 
official statistical Bulletin of the ASE. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the annual listing of the sample‟s 305 IPOs including the mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure classification of the corresponding earnings forecast. For eight years Greek IPOs 
were obliged to provide earnings forecasts while since 2001 forecasted profits were voluntary. 
Concentrating on the second period, from the total sample of 85 IPOs that were listed during the 2001-
2009 period, 24 IPOs chose not to provide earnings forecast in their prospectuses. We should mention at 
this point that no IPO was listed in Athens Stock Exchange in years 2008 and 2009 as a result of the 
global financial crisis. Evidently candidates for listing were concerned that they would not be able to raise 
the desired amount of funds so they decided to postpone their decision.   
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics for 281 IPOs that provide an earning forecast 
figure in their prospectuses. Prior to the IPO the firms had an average (median) total market capitalization 
of €42.6 million (€33.3 million) and an average (median) age of 17.2 years (14 years) by the year of 
listing. The time lag, the period between the announcement of the prospectus and first day of the stocks‟ 
listing, averages (median) 29.7 days (28 days) while the demand multiple relative to the number of shares 
issued averages (median) 91.5 times (25 times). The proportion of given ownership by the initial 
shareholders is on average 20%.  
10 
 
 
 
Table1 Greek IPO Sample Description 
Panel A: Number of observations in Greece and control sample by forecasted profits 
Event Year IPO firms full sample  Forecasted Profits 
  Mandatory Voluntary 
   Provide Forecast No Forecast 
1993 10 10   
1994 45 45   
1995 19 19   
1996 20 20   
1997 14 14   
1998 23 23   
1999 38 38   
2000 51 51   
2001 23  19 4 
2002 21  15 6 
2003 15  11 4 
2004 9  8 1 
2005 11  2 9 
2006 2  2  
2007 4  4  
2008 (No IPO Listed) 0  0  
2009 (No IPO Listed) 0  0  
Total 305 220 61 24 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Greek IPO firms(with forecast) 
 Mean Median Maximum 
Total market capitalisation of an IPO (€ million) 42.6 33.3 5900 
The age of the issuing firm (years) 17.29 14 106 
Time lag between the announcement of the prospectus and first 
day of stocks‟ listing (days)  
29.76 28 70 
Companies partially or fully owned by the Greek state 0.06 0.07 - 
Demand multiple on the number of shares issued (times) 91.55 25 760.6 
Underwriters reputation (dummy) 0.44 - - 
IPOs listed in the Hot or Cold Period (dummy)  0.29 - - 
Proportion of given ownership by the initial shareholders (%) 20.18 20 68.43 
IPOs belonging in the industrial sector (dummy) 0.17 - - 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Greek IPO firms (No forecast) 
 Mean Median Maximum 
Total market capitalisation of an IPO (€ million) 31.61 28.50 105.78 
The age of the issuing firm (years) 5.82 4 29 
Time lag between the announcement of the prospectus and first 
day of stocks‟ listing (days)  
24.75 24.5 37 
Companies partially or fully owned by the Greek state 0.08 0.06 - 
Demand multiple on the number of shares issued (times) 5.08 2.58 6.48 
Underwriters reputation (dummy) 0.61 - - 
IPOs listed in the Hot or Cold Period (dummy)  0.33 - - 
Proportion of given ownership by the initial shareholders (%) 16.47 13.69 42.92 
IPOs belonging in the industrial sector (dummy) 0.125 - - 
Panel D: Test of difference between Forecast and No Forecast Samples mean and medians. 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Market Capitalisation  (2.914)*** (-2.613)*** Demand Multiple (1.743)* (-1.269) 
Age of the issuing firm  (3.987)*** (-3.529)*** Given Ownership (1.903)* (-1.894)* 
Time Lag  (-0.648) (-0.157)    
Note: The table presents details of the Greek IPOs and control samples. Panel A provides the number of firms in each sample (mandatory, voluntary) in every 
calendar year this study covers. This panel provides details of the IPO samples as well as for the IPO listed in a mandatory disclosure environment, voluntary 
earnings forecast regime and IPOs that were not able to provide any forecast. Fiscal years are converted to calendar years as follows: fiscal years ending before 
December 31st are classified into the previous calendar year, while those ending on or after January 1st are classified into the current calendar year. Panels B and 
C present summary statistics on the IPO firms. Market value (capitalization) is computed as the number of shares outstanding after the offering times the offer 
price.  
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Panel C of table 1 provides summary statistics for the 24 IPOs that selected not to provide an 
earnings forecast in their prospectus. Statistics provide a first indication of the characteristics of those 
firms. Amongst other characteristics, IPOs choosing not to disclose an earnings forecast are considerably 
smaller - with average (median) total market capitalization of €31.6 million (€28.5 million) - than the total 
sample of firms and are much younger at the time they go public with an average (median) age of 5.82 
years (4 years).
12
 Demand multiple average (median) of 5.08 (2.58) indicates the low level of investors‟ 
interest for those IPOs. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
The forecast error measure reflects the difference between the actual and predicted figures for the same 
time period. The forecast error measures can be calculated with or without the error sign. Jaggi (1997), 
Chan, (1996), Chen et al. (2001), Cheng & Firth (2000) and more recently, McGuinness (2005) and 
Siougle (2007)
13
 report that the forecast error measure (FE) evaluates the bias in the forecasts, which 
mainly shows whether managers have been optimistic or pessimistic in their forecasts. Self-selection 
theory addresses this issue and partially explains why earnings forecasts are generally overoptimistic. 
McNichols et al. (1997) investigate the relation between analysts recommendations and earnings forecast 
and find that there is selectively in the analysts recommendations depending on whether information 
about a firm is favorable or unfavorable. A positive value for the mean forecast error (MFE) implies that, 
on average, IPO companies have a pessimistic bias (IPOs under-forecast) while a negative value for MFE 
represents an optimistic bias (IPOs over-forecast).  
The forecast error for the IPO‟s is calculated as follows: 
itititit FPFPAPFE /)(                                                                    (1) 
where FEit, is the forecast error for company i at date t, AP stands for actual profit and FP is the forecast 
profit. 
The mean forecast error examines whether the company‟s management systematically over or 
underestimates earnings for IPOs. The average forecast error based on the negative/positive measure of 
error, does not provide credible information on the average size of the error because negative and positive 
errors cancel each other out. Therefore, in order to determine the accuracy of forecasts the Absolute 
Forecast Error AFE measure is considered appropriate. 
                                               
12 In contrast the average (median) age of the 61 IPOs that elected to provide an earnings forecast during the voluntary period is 
20.16 years (14 years). This is a point that we will return to later. 
13 Siougle (2007) report for Greek SEO‟s that self-selection bias affects inferences.  
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The AFE is taken using the absolute value of the forecast errors FEs for each IPO. It provides an 
indication of how close the forecasts were to actual profits in absolute terms. The earnings are before tax 
and before extraordinary items. It is measured by:   
                                                  AFEit=│(APit-FPit) │/ │FPit│                                                                  (2) 
where AFE is the Absolute Forecast Error and all other terms are as defined previously. 
The management forecast superiority SUP measures the ability of management to predict 
earnings more accurately than a random walk model. SUP is estimated in order to measure the superiority 
of the company‟s management. It is also used by researchers to provide more accurate predictions of 
corporate earnings relative to forecasts derived from a simple random walk model. Brown et al. (1987) 
first developed the SUP measure that was subsequently used in many studies of IPO forecast accuracy 
such as Allen et al. (1997), Chen and Firth, (1999), Chen et al. (2001). A positive (negative) value for 
SUP means that the IPO profit forecast is more (less) accurate than a forecast based on the random walk 
model. The measure of superiority is applied here for the IPO market:  
SUP=ln[(APt-APt-1)/(APt-FPt)]
2
                                                              (3) 
where SUP is the superiority in forecasting profits relative to the actual change in profits, AP is the actual 
profit and FP is the profit forecast as given in the IPOs prospectus. The numerator measures the actual 
change in profit from the end of the year prior to the IPO t-1 to the end of the IPO year t and can be 
regarded as the forecast error from a simple time series forecast. 
The modified version of the SUP measure MSUP is calculated as 
MSUP=ln[(APt-GMF)/(APt-FPt)]
2
                                                         (4) 
where the growth model forecast GMF is measured as GM= APt-1(APt-1- APt-3)
1/2.
  
 
3.3. Hypothesis and Factors influencing magnitude of forecast errors.  
As the literature outlines there are a variety of factors that affect earnings-management behavior. Bearing 
this in mind, we select a number of explanatory variables in addition to variables designed to construct 
hypothesis concerning the behavioral response to the change in regulatory regime. A central hypothesis 
concerning the regulatory change is that earnings forecasts in the prospectuses of IPOs improve. 
Size:  Larger firms have more control over their market settings and are usually more diversified. 
They can spend more money to achieve accuracy by creating better information gathering and forecasting 
systems. Thus they will be able to employ the best expertise in the market using the most sophisticated 
forecasting techniques and computer technology to generate more accurate forecasts (e.g. Firth and Smith 
(1992), Mak (1994), Jaggi (1997)). Chen et al. (2001), Jog and McConomy (2003), Firth and Lonkani 
(2005) and Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2007) find that forecasts by large firms tend to be more accurate 
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than forecasts by smaller firms. Therefore large firm forecasts are expected to be more accurate than those 
of smaller firms.  
H1 The larger the company, the greater the forecast accuracy, and the lower the forecast error. Also the 
level of accuracy for older firms will increase after the introduction of the voluntary mechanism. 
Age: Those companies in operation for many years before listing would be in a better position to 
provide more detailed disclosure and predictions about their future performance because they are likely to 
have better control over their operations and better feeling for market environment (e.g. Firth and Smith 
(1992), Lee et al. (1993), Jaggi (1997), Jelic et al. (1998), Jog and McConomy (2003), Cazavan-Jeny and 
Jeanjean (2007). 
H2 The older the company, the greater the forecast accuracy, and the lower the forecast error. We expect 
older firms to dominate the sample of firms that disclosure an earnings forecast figure after the rotation of 
the disclosure regime. 
Time Lag: A fundamental factor supported by many studies (e.g. Lee et al. (1993), Firth, et al. 
1995, Jelic et al. (1998), Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Firth and Lonkhani (2005)) is that the length of the 
forecasting period
14
 influences the degree of forecast accuracy. Forecasts with a shorter time horizon are 
expected to be more accurate and those with longer time horizon are associated with greater uncertainty 
(Jaggi (1997)). This study differentiates from previous evidence as it explores a different time lag, the 
period between the announcement of the prospectus that includes the earnings forecast (rather than the 
prospectus publication date) and first day of stocks‟ listing in the stock market (rather than the end of the 
forecast period). The reason for this different theoretical approach is that we wish to search the „time‟ 
information much earlier than the official publication of the forecast and expect that its effect is relevant 
up to the date of listing rather than the actual earning announcement that can take place much latter than 
the IPO. Similar to time horizon we assume that short time lag will contribute in the accuracy of earnings 
forecast
15
.    
H3 The shorter the time lag of forecasts, the greater the accuracy of forecast, and the lower the forecast 
error. Disclosure of earnings forecast in the prospectus of IPOs during the voluntary period will have a 
short time lag period.  
Privatization: This is the first time a study explores whether firms with a large state ownership 
stake before going public influences earnings-management behavior. We expect that these firms are well 
                                               
14 The forecast period or time horizon is measured as the number of months between the prospectus date and the end of the 
forecast period. Usually the time horizon can be between two to sixteen months. We observed in this study that the regulatory 
switch from mandatory to voluntary status resulted in the typical time horizon of associated forecast disclosure. Issuers listing 
after the grace period for disclosure of most recent earnings, but well in advance of the forthcoming year-end, have been less 
inclined to post a forecast disclosure.    
15 As time horizon has been of immense importance in the literature we have tested if it improves the accuracy of earnings 
forecast but the results proved to be insignificant in the Greek Case. We thought to use time lag, the period between the 
announcement of the earnings forecast and listing in the stock exchange, as no previous study has researched on this factor.   
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known and any government would like to see a successful issue and achieve positive comments from the 
market and the media. Thus, we anticipate that a best effort will be made in order to achieve the highest 
possibly accuracy of earnings forecasts in the prospectuses.    
H4 The more control a state has on a firm at the time it goes public (privatizations), the greater the 
accuracy of the forecast, and the lower the forecast error. The change in disclosure regime will motivate 
privatized IPOs to provide an earnings forecast figure with the highest possible accuracy and signal their 
quality.    
Over subscription (Demand Multiple): In this paper we hypothesize an inverse relationship 
between the level of over subscription and the degree of forecast accuracy. We expect that uninformed 
investors will create a high demand for highly underpriced low quality IPOs that will be associated with 
high forecast error. We also suggest that shareholders and management of firms that receive a warm 
reception are more likely to bear less risk regarding the earnings forecast provided in their prospectuses.  
H5 The lower the level of oversubscription, the greater the accuracy of forecast and the lower the forecast 
error. IPOs disclosing earnings forecasts in their prospectuses during the voluntary regime are less 
underpriced and have a lower level of oversubscription.    
Underwriter Reputation
16
: The quality of the underwriter that is associated with the IPO 
earnings forecast is proxied using an underwriter dummy variable where one refers to one of the “Big 4” 
underwriters in Greece, zero otherwise. Chen and Firth (1999) hypothesize that underwriter reputation is 
positively related to the accuracy of earnings forecast because reputable underwriters aim to maintain 
their reputations by being associated with more accurate information disclosure. From the agency theory 
perspective, selecting high quality underwriters reduces high agency costs experienced by IPO firms. 
Moreover Ghikas et. al (2008) finds that underwriters align their interests to the old stockholders thereby 
affecting the quality of the earnings forecast by not incorporating adverse information provided by 
auditing qualified reports. 
H6 Forecast accuracy will be comparatively higher for companies underwritten by “Top Four” 
underwriters, which means lower forecast error for these companies. We expect reputable underwriters to 
be associated with IPOs that disclose earnings forecast during the voluntary period.     
Change in Capital Market Conditions (Hot/Cold):  Prior studies have measured various 
aspects of the economic environment as potential explanatory variables of forecast error but they have 
ignored the influence of capital market conditions. This study mainly focuses on the market environment 
and splits the environment into hot and cold periods. We believe that this factor has been neglected by 
previous studies. Our rationale is that if an earnings forecast takes place during a cold period and the 
                                               
16 Underwriters in the Greek stock market are either large banks (i.e., the National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank, 
Piraeus Bank) or major securities firms 
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actual earnings forecast is announced during a hot period then the actual figure can be much higher than 
expected (pessimistic forecast) and high forecast error can appear. Conversely if announcement of 
earnings forecast occurs during a hot period and the actual earnings forecast appears in the cold period 
then the results can be lower than expected (optimistic forecast) and again a high forecast error can 
appear. 
H7 Forecast accuracy will be higher during a „cold‟ period environment and lower during a „hot‟ period. 
Given Ownership: In Greece a good proportion of IPOs have their existing major shareholders 
as their leading directors who are personally responsible for the accuracy of earnings forecast. Jelic et al. 
(1998), Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Chen et al. (2001), Jog and McConomy (2003) and Cormier and 
Martinez (2006)
17
 argue that the larger the percentage of ownership retained by the entrepreneur at the 
IPO date the lower the incentive to manage earnings.  
H8 The lower the proportion of given ownership by the owners, the lower the forecast error. The change 
in disclosure regime will encourage IPOs selling a low proportion of the firm to announce earnings 
forecasts in their prospectuses. 
Industrial Classification
18
: This is probably the most well documented variable in the earning 
forecast accuracy literature. Because of differences in industry sector revenue volatility and cost structure, 
industry type is generally foreseen to influence forecast error.  
H9 IPOs classified as industrial are associated with comparatively high forecast error. These firms will 
avoid disclosing earnings forecasts in their prospectuses after the change of the disclosure regime. 
 
AFEs, FE, SUPs and MSUPs vary across companies and we construct cross-sectional models to help 
explain the variations. We regress AFEs, FE, SUPs, and MSUPs on macroeconomic and firm specific 
factors as follows. The model is: 
AFE or FE or SUP or MSUP = a + β1 SIZE + β2 AGE + β3 TLAG + β4 PRIV +β5 OVER + β6 UND + β7 
H/C + β8 OWN +β9 IND + εi 
19
                                                                                                                                                                (5) 
                                               
17 Cormier and Martinez (2006) report that the larger the number of inside shareholders, the smaller the problem if the forecasts 
are inaccurate. 
18 Industrial are classified as firms which belong in Chemicals, Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards 
sub-sectors. No industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real Estate/Property, Transportation, Tourism/Hotels etc.      
19 SIZE - the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, AGE - The operating history of the firm prior to going public. 
The age has been calculated as the number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its constitution before the year of 
listing, TLAG, Time lag is the number of days from prospectus date to the end of first day of trading, PRIV - Companies partially 
or fully owned by the Greek state before going public, get the value„1‟ and fully private companies get the value„0‟, OVER - 
demand multiple on the number of shares issued, UND - Underwriters reputation: „1‟ for reputable underwriters – five older and 
more experienced in underwriting tasks banking institutions – and „0‟ for non reputable, H/C - IPOs listed in the Hot Period get 
the value „1‟ and IPOs listed in Cold Period get the value „0‟,  OWN  - proportion of given ownership by the pre-IPO 
shareholders,  IND - Dummy variable taking the value of zero if the company is industrial classified, otherwise IND is coded 
zero if IPO belongs to service sector, transportation 
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Positive signs with absolute forecast error are expected for length of listing period (TLAG), market 
conditions (H/C), given ownership (OWN) and industrial classification (IND). Negative signs are 
expected on size (SIZE), age (AGE), privatised firms (PRIV), level of oversubscription (OVER) and 
underwriter quality (UND).   
 
4 Empirical Results on profit forecasts in Greek IPO prospectuses 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
The summary statistics of forecast errors, absolute forecast errors, and forecasting superiority measures, 
are shown in Table 2. The means, medians and standard deviations of errors are broken down by 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure environment. The mean (median) forecast error for the total sample is 
3.66 (-0.38%)
20
. The positive mean signs indicate that, on average, the forecast profits are less than the 
actual and so the forecasts are pessimistic. Breaking down the forecast error by mandatory and voluntary 
environment the results reveal a positive mean of 8.65% for IPOs providing an earnings forecast in their 
prospectuses during the mandatory period and a negative mean of -9.58% for IPOs providing a forecast of 
earnings during the voluntary period. This tells us that firms are very conservative when compelled to 
provide a forecast in their prospectuses and therefore actual profit are typically higher than forecast. Once 
the disclosure environment turns voluntary, Greek IPOs behave more liberally and the forecast error sign 
changes typically indicating more optimistic forecasts than the actual. This gives great support to the self-
selection theory   in part states that earnings forecasts during voluntary periods are generally 
overoptimistic. Note that in both cases the average forecast errors are below ±10% so we find a mean 
forecast error for Greece that is one of the lowest ever reported in an international study.  
However the picture is different when we examine the absolute forecast error. The mean (median) 
absolute forecast error for the total sample is 39.72% (31.03%), much larger than the average forecast 
error.  While introducing the voluntary regime appears to improve the AFE, the level of the absolute 
errors is still unsatisfactory. Making an effort to explain the improvement in accuracy during the 
voluntary regime we suggest that more quality firms provide the earnings forecast after the regulatory 
change and this improves the accuracy of the forecast. Moreover the potential for penalties for inaccurate 
forecast motivate IPOs to provide a more reliable earnings forecast figure and to make use of more 
advanced and costly forecast mechanisms. Still, lower median AFEs indicate that there are some IPOs 
                                               
20 The mean forecast error for the total sample in the Greek case is substantially less than the comparable statistics from Australia 
(Lee et al. (1993) and Hartnett and Romcke (2000)), Canada, Pedwell et al. (1994), China, Chen and Firth (1999) and New 
Zealand, Firth and Smith, (1992) but similar to the errors reported in Hong Kong (Chan et al. (1996), Jaggi (1997), Cheng and 
Firth (2000), Chen et al. (2001), Malaysia, Jelic et al. (1998), Singapore, Firth et al. (1995), Thailand, Firth and Lonkani (2005)) 
and in UK, (Keasey and McGuinness (1991)). 
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that provide unusual high absolute forecast errors. In these cases Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
could intervene and apply penalties.   
The mean absolute forecast error for the total sample in the Greek case is more than the errors 
reported in Hong Kong (Chan et al. (1996), Jaggi (1997), Cheng and Firth (2000), Chen et al. (2001)), 
Malaysia (Jelic et al. (1998)), Singapore (Firth et al. (1995)) the UK, (Keasey and McGuinness (1991)) 
and is similar to China (Chen and Firth (1999)) and Thailand (Firth and Lonkani (2005)) but less than the 
comparable statistics from Australia (Lee et al. (1993) and Hartnett and Romcke (2000)), Canada 
(Pedwell et al. (1994)) and New Zealand (Mak (1989), Firth and Smith (1992)).  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Forecast Errors and Superiority Measures 
 FE AFE SUP MSUP 
Panel A: Total Sample   
Mean 3.66 39.72 -0.275 1.258 
t-value 0.258 0.001 0.176 0.000 
Median -0.38 31.03 -0.133 1.257 
z-value 0.045 0.000 0.112 0.184 
St-dev 52.81 34.52 3.51 3.46 
Max 234.82 234.82 14.30 15.54 
Min -132.32 0.38 -9.86 -7.80 
     
Panel B: Mandatory Disclosure Environment  (1993-2000) 
Mean 8.65 40.32 0.026 1.541 
t-value 0.019 0.000 0.906 0.001 
Median 2.96 31.65 -0.009 1.508 
z-value 0.183 0.003 0.104 0.176 
St-dev 52.35 34.38 3.33 3.35 
Max 234.82 234.82 14.30 15.54 
Min -84.82 0.38 -9.86 -7.80 
     
Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure Environment (2001-2008) 
Mean -9.58 36.83 -1.052 0.520 
t-value 0.048 0.000 0.015 0.218 
Median -9.11 26.40 -1.482 -0.126 
z-value 0.282 0.053 0.435 0.292 
St-dev 48.72 32.96 3.860 3.67 
Max 163.30 163.30 11.492 13.81 
Min -90.30 0.57 -9.20 -6.47 
 
Panel D: Test of difference between Mandatory and Voluntary mean and medians. 
Mean (1.866)*  (1.783)* (0.727) (1.053) 
Median (-1.693)* (-2.083)** (-0.817) (-1.223) 
Note: FE = forecast error; FE = (Actual Profit (AP) – Forecast Profit (FP))/│Actual Profit (AP)│, AFE = absolute forecast error; AFE= 
│FE│, SUP= Brown et al. (1987) measure of superiority SUP = log [((AP t – APt-1)/(APt – FPt))
2
], MSUP = SUP = log [((AP t – APt-
1*G)/(APt – FPt))
2
]. 
**
 Significant at the 5% , 
*
 significant at the 10% level respectively. 
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Negative values are observed for the means and medians of the SUP scores. Voluntary FE 
disclosure IPOs experience lower SUP and MSUP scores but nevertheless they still have positive signs 
for MSUP. The MSUP means are larger than the SUP averages, which suggest that the growth model is a 
less accurate benchmark for assessing management‟s ability to forecast accurately than the pure random 
walk model. Finally the MSUP score for mandatory forecast earnings disclosure IPOs is significantly 
larger than the MSUP score for voluntary forecast earnings disclosure IPOs. 
Table 3 reviews three potential determinants of profit forecast accuracy. Offer Size, Age and 
Time lag are analytically examined and their relation with FE and AFE under mandatory and voluntary 
earnings forecast disclosure is presented. Panel A categorizes IPOs by offer size. A careful look reveals 
that small IPOs provide almost excellent forecast accuracy under the mandatory regime. This superior 
accuracy deteriorates once the voluntary regime commences. A similar tendency is present in the absolute 
forecast error metric with small offers presenting AFEs of 33.91% and 48.77% respectively under the 
mandatory and voluntary mechanisms. Interestingly, a voluntary disclosure environment appears to help 
in the case of large firms as their AFE improves dramatically from 48.01% to 26.05%. Overall we get 
more stable results and somewhat lower absolute forecast errors under the voluntary disclosure method 
giving support to voluntary disclosure theory. Evidently managers expend effort to reduce forecast error 
and information asymmetry thereby signaling the quality of firms when volunteering to provide a forecast 
of earnings.  
Panel B segments IPOs by age at the time of going public, computed as the year of the IPO minus 
the year of founding. There is strong evidence that firms with a longer pre-IPO history have lower 
absolute forecast errors. Specifically IPOs with more than three decades of business experience have a FE 
(AFE) of 1.60% (23.10%) under mandatory and a FE (AFE) of -4.09% (22.26%) under voluntary 
earnings disclosure. In contrast companies with a pre-IPO history of seven years or less are less able to 
provide an accurate (absolute) forecast because the forecast error is on average around 15-18% and the 
absolute forecast error is between 43-45% in both disclosure environments.  
In panel C firms are categorized by time lag. The results show that IPOs with a short time lag 
provide a very good earnings forecast because the mean (absolute) forecast error is 1.95% (29.78%) under 
mandatory and -1.52% (19.72%) under voluntary earnings disclosure. A much poorer result occurs for 
IPOs with a long time lag since the mean (absolute) forecast error is 15.50% (44.16%) and -30.63% 
(50.32%) for mandatory and voluntary methods respectively.  
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Table 3 Distribution of Initial Public Offerings Sample by Offer Size, Age and Time lag 
Panel A: Forecast Error (FE) and Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) Categorised by Size 
Offer Size Sample 
Size 
Mandatory Sample 
Size 
Voluntary 
(Million) €  FE  AFE  FE AFE 
2-9.9 35 -0.03 33.91 8 -16.67 48.77 
10-19.9 45 13.36 42.61 15 1.76 47.41 
20-49.9 49 13.21 40.48 20 -19.26 40.54 
50-99.9 44 1.88 34.57 14 -11.16 26.49 
>100 47 9.15 48.01 7 -10.77 26.05 
 
Panel B: Forecast Error (FE) and Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) Categorised by Age 
AGE Sample 
Size 
Mandatory Sample 
Size 
Voluntary 
(years)  FE AFE  FE AFE 
0-7 44 15.61 45.54 12 18.77 43.54 
8-14 55 16.65 43.35 15 -33.06 37.98 
15-22 53 -0.03 44.37 14 -8.02 39.18 
23-29 36 -0.71 36.41 9 -9.64 28.59 
>30 32 1.60 23.10 11 -4.09 22.26 
 
Panel C: Forecast Error (FE) and Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) Categorised by Time lag 
Time lag Sample 
Size 
Mandatory Sample 
Size 
Voluntary 
(days)  FE AFE  FE AFE 
7-19 34 1.95 29.78 11 -1.52 19.72 
20-24 37 17.79 48.49 14 -8.87 39.62 
25-30 49 3.20 35.64 20 -22.15 45.66 
31-39 56 2.94 40.10 10 4.90 38.37 
40-70 44 15.50 44.16 8 -30.63 50.32 
Note: Size is computed as the number of shares outstanding after the offering times the offer price. The age has been 
calculated as the number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its constitution before the year of listing. 
The Time lag is the period between the announcement of the prospectus and first day of stocks‟ listing in the stock  
market. 
 
In order to get a better insight into the structure of forecast errors the frequency distribution of 
forecast errors are provided in Table 4. The results show that of the total sample of 220 mandatory 
forecasts, 115 predictions have positive forecast errors and the remaining 105 have negative forecast 
errors. Since the frequency distribution shows that most forecasts have positive errors then the actual 
results for most companies are higher than forecasts. In other words most Greek companies providing 
mandatory forecast earnings have been underestimating rather overestimating forecast profits and are 
generally conservative during mandatory disclosure environments. This finding for the Greek case differs 
significantly from the reported findings for other countries, which find that companies generally 
overestimate forecast earnings.  
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Table 4 Summary of FE and AFE by year of listing and by status of Management Earnings 
Forecast 
Panel A: Percentage Forecast Error 
Mandatory (1993-2000) 
Listing Year <-25% -25% to 0% 0% to 25% Over 25% Total FE (%) 
1993 3 1 4 2 10 -4.12 
1994 12 11 9 13 45 -0.02 
1995 3 3 4 9 19 33.36 
1996 5 7 3 5 20 11.28 
1997 4 3 4 3 14 3.77 
1998 4 4 7 8 23 15.98 
1999 10 9 9 10 38 10.09 
2000 15 11 11 14 51 4.90 
1993-2000 56 49 51 64 220 8.65 
 
Voluntary (2001-2009) 
2001 9 6 2 2 19 -26.61 
2002 7 2 4 2 15 -4.05 
2003 4 2 3 2 11 -4.32 
2004 2 1 5 0 8 -7.10 
2005 1 0 1 0 2 -31.41 
2006 0 0 2 0 2 8.62 
2007 1 0 2 1 4 -0.55 
2001-2007 24 11 19 7 61 -9.58 
Total 80 60 70 71 281 3.98 
Panel B: Percentage Absolute Forecast Error 
Mandatory (1993-2000) 
Listing Year <20% 20% to 40% 40% to 60% Over 60% Total AFE (%) 
1993 4 4 2 0 10 21.56 
1994 12 14 9 10 45 37.22 
1995 5 5 3 6 19 48.86 
1996 8 3 3 6 20 47.17 
1997 4 4 3 3 14 32.58 
1998 10 3 4 6 23 35.75 
1999 10 9 8 11 38 50.70 
2000 17 13 10 11 51 38.18 
1993-2000  70 55 42 53 220 40.32 
 
Voluntary (2001-2009) 
2001 8 3 3 5 19 37.37 
2002 6 1 4 4 15 50.60 
2003 4 1 5 1 11 39.62 
2004 4 2 1 1 8 25.81 
2005 1 0 0 1 2 46.63 
2006 1 1 0 0 2 8.62 
2007 2 1 1 0 4 19.81 
1993-2000 26 9 14 12 61 36.83 
Total 96 64 56 65 281 39.72 
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Results for IPOs that provide earnings forecast during the voluntary regime show that out of the 
total sample of 61 IPOs, 35 have negative forecast errors, and 26 forecasts have positive forecast errors. 
This result is the opposite of the mandatory sample indicating that voluntary earnings forecast results for 
most companies are higher than actual. Thus the majority of Greek companies presenting voluntary 
forecast earnings have been overestimating forecast profits. This is a surprising result as it shows that 
switching to voluntary earnings forecasts encourages IPOs to overestimate their abilities and release in 
their prospectuses forecast profits that overestimate actual earnings of the IPOs. It is obvious that Greek 
companies in recent years include optimistic forecasts in their prospectuses in order to attract subscribers 
to buy stocks. Evidently they attempt to persuade potential investors of the attractiveness of their 
ambitious investment plans, a totally different mentality from the prior mandatory regime. 
The mean AFE for Greek companies is 40.32%, 36.83% and 39.72% for mandatory, voluntary 
and total samples respectively. The majority of IPOs in both samples experience an absolute forecast error 
of less than 20% (70 IPOs listed under mandatory and 26 IPOs listed under the voluntary regime). While 
a good proportion of the firms (53 out of 220 or 24.09%) that are obliged to provide an earnings forecast 
have absolute forecast error of more than 60%, there are an unexpectedly large number of firms (12 out of 
61 or 19.67%) with absolute forecast error of more than 60% that provide voluntary forecasts. Since the 
regulation has changed so that IPOs can provide an earnings forecast only if they feel confident that they 
will provide an accurate forecast then higher penalties for inaccurate forecasts can be justified.   
To provide more insight into inaccurate forecasts, Table 5 presents the frequency distribution of 
these errors and it has some interesting results to deliver. Providing the corresponding underpricing 
between the periods further enriches those results. In Table 5 we see that 52.3 percent of IPOs with 
mandatory earnings forecasts have positive signs (pessimistic forecast) and 47.7 percent of those IPOs 
have negative signs (optimistic forecast). Also, 12.7 percent (28 firms) of IPOs have an AFE between 0-
10 percent and 5 percent (11 firms) of IPOs have an AFE of more than 100 percent.  
Overall there appears to be a positive relation between the level of AFE and MAIR. The 
underpricing for IPOs with mandatory earnings forecasts and sever AFEs is high at 74.93% revealing that 
high absolute forecast error can signal severe underpricing. In contrast IPOs with voluntary forecasts and 
severe AFEs have a much lower level of underpricing at 28.87 percent. Nevertheless just one step down 
in the level of AFEs we find that voluntary earnings forecast disclosure IPOs experiences severe 
underpricing of 81.03% and underpricing when the AFE is much lower at 20% - 30%. It is interesting to 
note the case of voluntary disclosures where AFEs were 40% to 50%. Here we see overpricing by 7.45% 
meanings that their offer price was higher than their closing price at the end of first day of trading. We 
notice that stock market investors quickly correct for the inefficient offer pricing of the underwriters, just 
as Ghikas et al. (2008) would lead us to expect.  
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Table 5 Frequency Distribution of Forecast Error and Absolute Forecast Error by Mandatory and 
Voluntary provision of Management earnings   
Panel A: Mandatory (1993-2000) 
Distribution of FE No of IPOs MAIR (%) 
Distribution of 
AFE No of IPOs MAIR (%) 
FE≤-0.6 18 39.82 0<AFE≤0.1 28 35.49 
-0.6<FE≤0.4 21 20.52 0.1<AFE≤0.2 41 38.48 
-0.4<FE≤-0.2 32 32.58 0.2<AFE≤0.3 32 13.23 
-0.2<FE≤-0.1 18 24.89 0.3<AFE≤0.4 20 15.05 
-0.1<FE≤0 16 29.90 0.4<AFE≤0.5 20 22.12 
0<FE≤0.1 19 29.71 0.5<AFE≤0.6 19 37.64 
0.1<FE≤0.2 21 43.50 0.6<AFE≤0.7 17 44.52 
0.2<FE≤0.4 20 48.84 0.7<AFE≤0.8 10 41.36 
0.4<FE≤0.6 18 40.37 0.8<AFE≤0.9 12 53.70 
0.6<FE≤0.8 17 38.41 0.9<AFE≤1.00 10 32.88 
FE≥0.8 20 45.81 AFE≥100 11 74.93 
Total 220 39.89  220 39.89 
      
Panel B: Voluntary (2001-2009) 
FE≤-0.6 8 40.10 0<AFE≤0.1 10 24.03 
-0.6<FE≤0.4 11 6.92 0.1<AFE≤0.2 12 39.30 
-0.4<FE≤-0.2 5 32.48 0.2<AFE≤0.3 4 6.43 
-0.2<FE≤-0.1 5 70.18 0.3<AFE≤0.4 4 38.90 
-0.1<FE≤0 6 11.33 0.4<AFE≤0.5 8 -7.45 
0<FE≤0.1 6 32.50 0.5<AFE≤0.6 6 19.60 
0.1<FE≤0.2 11 28.08 0.6<AFE≤0.8 7 81.03 
FE≥0.2 9 14.08 AFE≥0.8 11 28.87 
 61 18.77  61 18.77 
Note: Market Adjusted Initial Returns (Underpricing) is defined as the percentage difference between the closing 
price on the first day of trading and the offer price for the IPO minus the closing price of the Athens Stock Exchange 
General Index on the first day of trading and the price of the General index in the end of the offer price day.  
Sample: 281 IPOs (disclosing earnings forecast) listed in the Greek Stock Exchange between January 1993 and July 
2009 
 
4.2. Panel Regression Analysis 
Table 6 show the regression results for the 281 firms that provide a forecast during either the mandatory 
or the voluntary regime on absolute forecast error, forecast error, superiority of management forecasts and 
superiority of management forecasts adjusted for growth of earnings. All twelve regressions (four each 
for mandatory, voluntary and overall sample of IPOs) are well specified and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Adjusted R
2
s are sometimes poor 
21
 but for the mandatory sample of IPOs they are 
                                               
21 The adjusted R2s are quite similar to studies on earnings forecast. Chen and Firth (1999) report poor explanation power of 
between 6.6 percent and 1.8 percent. Chen et al. (2001) obtains R2s of 1.6 percent (AFE), 11.5 percent (SUP) and 9.3 percent 
(MSUP). A third study by Firth and Lonkani (2005) obtains an R2 of 2 percent.   
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about average for what we see in the literature and are somewhat higher for IPOs with voluntary earnings 
forecast disclosure. The models are estimated using robust regressions. 
The size control variable is positive for the mandatory earnings forecast and for the total sample 
of IPOs implying that larger companies have higher forecast errors. In contrast the size coefficient for 
IPOs that voluntarily provide an earnings forecast is negative, suggesting that larger companies then have 
lower forecast errors. All size coefficients for the AFE regressions are statistically significant. In other 
words, we find compelling evidence that larger firms provide more accurate forecasts under the voluntary 
earnings forecast regime and more inaccurate forecasts under the mandatory regime. Therefore there is 
strong support for our Hypothesis 1. Our results are in line with Firth-Smith (1992) for New Zealand, 
Jaggi (1997) for Hong Kong, Firth and Lonkani (2005) for Thailand companies and opposite to Chen et 
al. (2001) for Hong Kong and Cormier and Martinez (2006) for French companies. The results of other 
studies, such as Firth et al. (1995) for Singapore and Harnett and Romcke (2000) for Australian 
companies find no significant association between company size and forecast accuracy. Overall the 
significant size variable can be a result of more control as to when Greek firms provide an earnings 
forecast as Greece switched from the mandatory to the voluntary earnings forecast regime. 
The coefficient for company‟s age for our total sample and for the mandatory disclosure 
environment has the expected negative sign and for the AFE regressions, it is highly significant. This 
indicates that companies with a long operational history before listing have lower forecast errors 
indicating that the accuracy of their profit forecasts are comparatively high. The sign of the coefficient is 
consistent with the results of some earlier studies that show a significant association between forecast 
accuracy and company‟s age e.g. Jaggi (1997) and Jelic et al.(1998). The results of earlier studies for 
China, Chen and Firth, (1999) and Hong Kong companies, Chen et al. (2001) did not show any significant 
association between accuracy and the company‟s age. The results of this study are interpreted to mean 
that Greek companies that are in existence for a longer period of time can expect to have more accurate 
forecasts than younger companies. These findings are in accordance with Jaggi (1997) and could reflect 
the enthusiasm of younger companies in providing an over optimistic picture of future performance and 
thus inaccurate forecasts. Another explanation could be that companies with more experience have a 
better knowledge of the market environment and have better control over their operations compared to 
younger companies. These results support Hypothesis 2 of this study. 
The time lag variable for all Greek IPOs that provide an earnings forecast are positive as expected 
and in the case of the AFE regression for the overall sample for both mandatory and voluntary reporting 
environments, the coefficient is statistically significant. Therefore companies are likely to make more 
accurate predictions when the time period between the offer price and first day of trading is comparatively 
short. The positive sign of our time lag coefficient is in accordance with previous studies for time horizon 
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which shows a significant relation between „TIME‟ of forecast and forecast accuracy, e.g. Firth, et al. 
(1995) on Singapore companies, Jaggi (1997) on Hong Kong companies and Chen and Firth (1999) on 
Chinese companies.  However Chan et al. (1996) and Cheng and Firth (1999) for Hong Kong and Jelic et 
al. (1998) for Malaysia have not reported any significant association between two variables for the Hong 
Kong companies.
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 Our results indicate that forecast accuracy is improved with a shorter time lag. The 
significant AFE coefficient for the overall sample support our Hypothesis 3 that Greek companies with 
shorter time lag will have more accurate IPO forecasts.  
The privatization variable is not in the expected direction because a positive coefficient indicates 
that privatized firms experience higher absolute forecast error. The perverse sign is statistically significant 
in the case of the AFE regression under the mandatory reporting environment. As this is the first study to 
test this variable we are in the position to provide the first result. Obviously our finding does not provide 
support to Hypothesis 4 that privatized companies tend to provide more accurate forecasts. Instead, it 
appears as though newly privatized firms behave as if they were young companies without much 
experience in the newly privatized environment and so provide inaccurate earnings forecasts, especially 
when forced to do so under the mandatory earnings forecast regime. 
The over subscription (demand multiple) variable is positive and of the opposite sign from 
expected. The coefficients are statistically significant in many cases particularly for the overall sample. 
The positive coefficients suggest that companies with greater investor demand experience higher forecast 
errors meaning that their forecasts are less accurate. This does not confirm our expectation that investors 
express greater demand for shares of IPOs with greater earnings accuracy. Instead the direction of the 
errors seems to be the operative influence because for the overall period, the AFE coefficient is not 
significant but the FE coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. This positive association 
between IPO share demand and forecasts of earnings that are too low suggests that investors can detect 
when the company is being too conservative in their earnings forecasts and so increase the demand for the 
shares. While these results are unexpected and do not provide support for our Hypothesis 5 they still 
appear reasonable. 
The company‟s underwriter reputation variable has the expected sign for IPOs that voluntarily 
provide earnings forecast but the coefficient for IPOs that have to provide earnings in their prospectuses 
and the total sample of IPOs do not have the expected sign. Nevertheless none of the coefficients for the 
AFE and FE regressions are significant. These results do not support Hypothesis 6 that IPOs forecast 
accuracy would be higher if a “Big-Five” underwriter underwrites the company. The results of earlier 
studies sometimes find an association between the forecast accuracy and the company‟s underwriter. 
                                               
22 Also Firth and Smith (1992) did not report any significant association between forecast accuracy and forecast 
horizon for New Zealand companies 
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Cheng and Firth (2000) for Hong Kong companies find that IPOs underwritten with reputable 
underwriters are associated high forecast error. However just one year later Chen et al. (2001) for the 
same market did not find any association between the forecast accuracy and the company‟s underwriter. 
Chen and Firth (1999) and Jog and McConomy (2003) also do not report this connection for Chinese and 
Canadian companies respectively. Therefore our results seem to confirm the findings of earlier studies.  
The coefficient for market condition H/C is negative for the mandatory disclosure environment 
and for the total sample. The negative coefficients suggest that IPOs listed during a „hot market 
environment‟ can have more accurate forecasts and less forecast errors. However none of the coefficients 
are statistically significant, which means that there is no significant association between forecast accuracy 
and market condition. These results do not provide much support for Hypothesis 7, that companies listed 
during „hot‟ market periods would make less accurate forecasts. However for voluntary disclosures the 
coefficient is positive. Again the direction of the errors seems to be the operative influence because the 
AFE coefficient is not significant but the FE coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that the errors during „hot‟ market conditions are caused by over-conservative forecasts. 
Moreover the SUP coefficient is also significantly negative at the 1% level clearly indicating that 
management could reduce these forecast errors by merely extrapolating from the past. This suggests that 
management is understating their forecast earnings during „hot‟ market conditions. Overall these results 
suggest that for voluntary disclosures during „hot‟ market conditions firms provide conservative and 
therefore inaccurate earnings forecasts. 
The company‟s given ownership variable is unexpectedly negative for all three sets of AFE 
regressions and are statistical significant in the cases of the voluntary disclosure and the overall sample. 
Moreover the MSUP for voluntary and mandatory disclosures are also significantly negative, clearly 
indicating that management provide forecasts that are inferior to a simple extrapolation from past 
earnings. Overall the results confirm that the larger the portion of the firm sold via IPO the more accurate 
and credible are the earnings forecasts, especially when earning forecasts are voluntary, thereby 
supporting the substitution effect hypothesis. We interpret this result to mean that when a large portion of 
the firm is sold via IPO, management make some effort to provide accurate earnings forecasts in an 
attempt to encourage demand for their shares. Evidently the MSUP coefficients are suggesting that there 
is some room for improvement in these forecasts however. Interestingly this relation is not statistically 
significant for mandatory disclosures suggesting that forcing firms to provide earnings forecasts when 
they are unwilling or unable to provide an accurate forecast could obscure this relation. The direction of 
the coefficients is consistent with the findings of some previous studies that have shown a significant 
association between forecast accuracy and company‟s percentage of given ownership. The results by 
Cormier and Martinez (2006) for France show a significant association between forecast errors and a high 
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proportion of retained ownership. Jelic et al. (1998) for Malaysia and Hartnett and Romcke (2000) for 
Australia did not find any association between retained equity and forecast error while Chen and Firth 
(1999) for China and Chen et al. (2001) for Hong Kong report the percentage of shares sold to the public 
has a positive sign in modeling AFE that conflict with their hypothesized relationship.  
We interpret the significantly negative given ownership variable to mean that Greek companies 
that sell a large piece of their capital will make more accurate forecasts, especially when they have the 
choice to do so, than IPOs that decide to sell just a small proportion. An explanation could be that 
companies that sell a large proportion of their capital are more anxious than companies that retain a large 
proportion of their ownership to achieve a successful IPO so they make an effort to acquire a better 
understanding of market conditions and invest more money to get a better picture of their accounts. These 
results confound Hypothesis 8 of this study. 
The industry control coefficients for all three sets of regressions are of the expected sign and the 
coefficient for IPOs that have to provide earnings forecasts are statistically significant. The positive and 
significant coefficient suggests that non-industrial firms make more accurate profit forecasts. Moreover 
we find that the industry control variable is positive and significant under the voluntary regime for the 
SUP and MSUP regressions suggesting that when industrial firms voluntarily provide an earnings forecast 
they are able to make a forecast that is more accurate than a simple random walk or geometric growth 
average extrapolation from past results. The sign of the coefficients is consistent with the findings of 
earlier studies that show a significant association between forecast error and the company‟s industrial 
classification. The results by Jelic et al. (1998) for Malaysia and Hartnett and Romcke (2000) for 
Australia show significant association between industrial IPOs and forecast errors. They also report that 
unexpected industry activity appears to be a useful proxy for forecasting errors. Finally Chan et al. 
(1996), Jaggi (1997) and Chen et al. (2001) for Hong Kong and Chen and Firth (1999) for China do not 
find any association between industrial classification and forecast error. Our findings provide support to 
Hypothesis 9 at least in the case for mandatory earnings forecast disclosure that non-industrial companies 
tend to provide more accurate forecasts. 
 Table 7 provides a final series of regressions using a dummy variable to distinguish between the 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure sub-samples. The results strongly confirm that during the mandatory 
period IPOs provide earnings forecasts that have greater forecast errors. This is additional evidence of the 
poor market mechanism during the mandatory period for communicating likely future earnings and 
indicates how necessary it was to convert to a voluntary regime. These findings make transparent that 
voluntary disclosure with penalties in case of inaccuracies can be the best way to achieve investor‟s 
protection and market efficiency.    
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Table 6 Cross Sectional Regression results explaining AFE, FE, SUM, MSUP Accuracy measures of Greek IPOs  
 
Specifications 
(1) AFE 
Mandatory  
(2) FE 
Mandatory 
(3) SUP 
Mandatory 
(4) MSUP 
Mandatory 
(5) AFE 
Voluntary 
(6) FE 
Voluntary 
(7) SUP 
Voluntary 
(8) MSUP 
Voluntary 
(9) AFE 
1993-2008 
(10) FE 
1993-2008 
(11) SUP 
1993-2008 
(12) MSUP 
1993-2008 
Constant -27.08 -52.35 3.14 6.01 153.56 56.27 2.36 4.74 -8.61 -53.00 -8.79 4.29 
SIZE (-) 0.150 0.090 -0.008 -0.040 -0.293 -0.215 -0.115 -0.125 0.131 0.082 0.224 -0.029 
 (1.954)* (1.092) (-0.115) (-0.477) (-2.163)** (-1.039) (-0.917) (-0.876) (1.907)* (0.949) (2.043)** (-0.355) 
AGE (-) -0.138 -0.103 -0.125 -0.116 0.013 0.055 0.371 0.387 -0.167 -0.077 -0.033 0.009 
 (-2.627)** (-1.408) (-1.417) (-1.340) (0.093) (0.305) (2.852) (3.969) (-3.281)*** (-1.272) (-0.410) (0.122) 
Time Lag (+) 0.157 0.132 -0.134 -0.125 0.071 0.030 0.007 0.066 0.117 0.090 0.034 -0.114 
 (1.485) (1.766) (-1.636) (-1.790) (0.628) (0.188) (0.068) (0.680) (1.787)* (1.451) (0.548) (-1.622) 
PRIV (-) 0.128 0.025 -0.050 -0.128 0.137 0.076 -0.120 0.001 0.058 0.22 -0.062 -0.045 
 (1.682)* (0.343) (-0.909) (-2.160) (1.177) (0.510) (-0.986) (-0.005) (0.802) (0.322) (-1.002) (-0.847) 
OVER (-) 0.078 0.088 -0.032 0.016 0.344 0.022 0.031 0.077 0.062 0.128 0.109 0.103 
 (0.778) (1.151) (-0.455) (0.260) (2.556)** (0.145) (0.240) (0.523) (0.676) (2.005)** (1.864)* (1.855)* 
UND (-) 0.027 0.055 -0.020 -0.047 -0.049 0.028 0.212 0.091 0.047 0.034 0.017 -0.031 
 (0.453) (0.748) (-0.264) (-0.600) (-0.439) (0.204) (2.549)** (0.972) (0.796) (0.762) (0.262) (-0.484) 
HC (+) -0.029 -0.007 0.121 0.129 0.251 0.309 -0.253 -0.025 -0.043 0.018 -0.016 0.022 
 (-0.388) (-0.092) (1.587) (1.786)* (1.770) (2.137)** (-2.957)*** (-0.224) (-0.709) (0.319) (0.257) (0.343) 
OWN (+) -0.062 -0.108 -0.136 -0.134 -0.243 0.233 -0.109 -0.281 -0.100 -0.030 -0.070 -0.110 
 (-0.918) (-1.475) (-1.634) (-1.808)* (-2.516)** (1.632) (-1.023) (-2.549)** (-1.776)* (-0.243) (-1.092) (-1.618) 
IND (+) 0.119 0.068 -0.044 -0.085 0.177 0.148 0.335 0.385 0.061 0.062 -0.001 -0.015 
 (1.826)* (0.962) (-0.691) (-1.356) (1.489) (1.074) (2.671)*** (3.348)*** (1.020) (1.005) (0.026) (-0.292) 
Adj. R2 0.094 0.053 0.070 0.104 0.259 0.235 0.209 0.263 0.066 0.061 0.060 0.048 
No. of IPOs 220 220 220 220 61 61 61 61 281 281 281 281 
F-statistic 2.78 2.36 2.57 2.73 3.37 3.25 3.11 3.95 2.49 2.43 2.33 2.21 
Notes: Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in earnings management subsequent to listing for 281 Greek initial public offers of ordinary equity made between January 1993 and December 2009. The dependent 
variables are forecast error FE absolute forecast error AFE, forecast superiority SUP and modified forecast superiority MSUP. The independent variables are, SIZE - the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, AGE - the 
number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its inception before the year of listing, TLAG - time lag is the period between the announcement of the prospectus and first day of the stocks‟ listing, PRIV - companies partially 
or fully owned by the Greek state before going public have the value„1‟ and fully private companies have the value„0‟, OVER - demand multiple on the number of shares issued, UND - underwriters reputation: „1‟ for reputable 
underwriters defined as one of the five older and more experienced underwriting banks and „0‟ for non reputable underwriters, H/C - IPOs listed under hot market conditions have the value „1‟ and IPOs listed under cold market 
conditions have the value „0‟,  OWN  - proportion of given ownership by the pre-IPO shareholders,  IND - dummy variable taking the value of one if the company is industrial otherwise IND zero. *** Significant at the one per cent 
level. **Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the ten per cent level, t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance process 
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Table 7 Cross Sectional Regression results using a dummy for Mandatory/Voluntary Periods 
Specifications (1) AFE (2) FE (3) SUP (4) MSUP 
Constant -33.70 -95.05 -1.26 4.89 
SIZE  0.151 0.115 0.046 -0.068 
 (2.456)** (1.696)* (0.308) (-0.907) 
AGE -0.176 -0.096 0.000 0.019 
 (-2.785)*** (-1.424) (0.005) (0.252) 
Time Lag 0.064 0.032 -0.065 -0.138 
 (1.052) (0.543) (-0.986) (-2.321)** 
PRIV 0.056 0.026 -0.012 -0.034 
 (0.952) (0.333) (-0.199) (-0.478) 
OVER 0.061 0.136 0.047 0.063 
 (1.006) (2.021)** (0.662) (0.800) 
UND 0.071 0.073 0.020 -0.001 
 (1.263) (1.107) (0.261) (-0.032) 
HC -0.092 -0.042 0.012 0.026 
 (-1.546) (-0.601) (0.162) (0.444) 
OWN -0.083 -0.001 -0.032 -0.055 
 (-1.354) (-0.030) (-0.545) (-0.871) 
IND 0.068 0.073 -0.005 -0.014 
 (1.166) (1.185) (-0.070) (-0.271) 
Mandatory 0.174 0.181 0.140 0.135 
 (2.784)*** (2.817)*** (1.999)** (1.983)** 
     
R
2 
Adjusted 0.098 0.080 0.059 0.051 
F-value 2.92 2.24 1.53 1.46 
N 281 281 281 281 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
The main purpose of this study is to provide for the first time a direct comparison between IPOs that were 
obliged to provide an earning forecast in their prospectuses with those that were allowed to voluntarily 
disclose earnings forecast. Using a sample of 305 Greek IPOs over the period 1993-2009, four error 
metrics were calculated. In line with self-selection theory the study reveals that manager‟s behaviour 
changes as their tendency towards pessimism by underestimating earnings during the mandatory period 
(1993-2000) is converted to optimism in the voluntary period (2001-2009). Earnings forecast accuracy 
increases following the introduction of voluntary disclosure but still perhaps not to the level that would 
satisfy regulators and investors.  This behavioral change implies that management confidence increases 
under the voluntary regime so that they reveal higher and somewhat more accurate figures in the earnings 
forecast.    
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 The voluntary disclosure method allows twenty-four out of a total sample of eighty one Greek 
IPOs to avoid disclosing earnings forecast information for reasons such as a lack of confidence in their 
ability to forecast, poor income expectations, prohibitively high proprietary costs and high costs of 
acquiring information. For those that do voluntarily provide earnings forecasts we find that younger firms 
with smaller IPOs and a long time lag between the forecast and the IPO issue date provides inaccurate 
forecasts. Compared to firms that was compelled to do so however, we find that errors decrease with the 
age of the firm, the size of the issue and the shorter the time lag.  
 A close look at the level of adjusted initial returns indicates that IPOs that disclose earnings 
forecasts in the voluntary environment obtain a significantly lower degree of under pricing on average. 
This signals better management as the IPO does not leave large amounts of money „on the table‟ for new 
investors. An analysis of the „mandatory‟ IPOs subgroup indicates that under pricing is well spread out 
amongst the optimistic and pessimistic forecasts. 
Cross-sectional regressions are used to model four metrics of earnings forecast accuracy and find 
important differences between the mandatory and volunteer earnings forecast regimes. For firms that must 
provide earnings forecasts, larger firms have larger absolute forecast errors. In contrast, for firms that 
volunteer earnings forecasts, larger firms have lower absolute forecast errors. We interpret this to mean 
that under the voluntary regime, larger firms that can provide accurate forecasts do so while firms that are 
unable to provide a reliable forecast chose not to disclose a forecast. Moreover the age and the 
privatization variables indicate that firms inexperienced in their business environments have difficulties in 
providing earnings forecasts as they obtain larger errors than older and private companies. However while 
these relations are statistically significant in the mandatory regime, they are insignificant in the voluntary 
regime clearly suggesting that firms that are unable to make accurate earnings forecasts chose not to do so 
under the voluntary regime. These three instances of self-selection could explain why the absolute 
earnings forecast errors decrease under the voluntary regime.  
Demand multiples are positively but not significantly related to forecast errors under the 
mandatory disclosure rules now turn significantly positively related to forecast errors under the voluntary 
disclosure rules. Examining this coefficient for the combined sample we discover that it is the direction of 
the forecast errors rather than the level of the forecast errors is the operative influence here. Together 
these findings suggest that investors can detect when the company is being too conservative in their 
earnings forecasts and so increase the demand for the shares. The last finding indicates an opportunity for 
improving the IPO market for uninformed investors. If IPOs chose to make a greater effort to provide 
more accurate figures they will reduce the cost of information for uninformed investor‟s thereby 
increasing demand for their initial share offering.  
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We find a perverse inverse relation between „hot‟ market conditions and forecast errors for the 
mandatory disclosure environment without this relation being statistically significant. In contrast, the 
relation turns significantly positive under the voluntary disclosure environment. Again the direction of the 
errors seems to be the operative influence suggesting that for voluntary disclosures during „hot‟ market 
conditions firms understate earnings forecasts to avoid the possibility of disappointing investors should 
their projected good results turn sour.  
Finally the firm‟s given ownership variable is unexpectedly negatively related to forecast errors 
but is only statistically significant during the voluntary disclosure regime. We interpret this result to mean 
that when a large portion of the firm is sold via IPO, the management makes some effort to provide 
accurate earnings forecasts in an attempt to encourage demand for their shares. However this relation is 
significant only during the voluntary regime because only firms that can provide accurate forecasts do so. 
Overall then we observe that under the voluntary regime forecast errors decrease somewhat on 
average as firms that can provide more accurate forecasts do so. This is especially evident for large firms 
and for firm that need to sell a large portion of the firm. However that does not prevent firms from 
manipulating their forecasts by deliberately understating their forecasts when they wish to signal the 
quality of their IPO, noticeably so when market conditions are „hot‟. These results suggest that allowing 
for a voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts is a good idea that especially benefits young firms that 
otherwise would have difficulties in providing private information directly to the capital market. On the 
basis of these findings we conclude that IPOs earnings forecasts disclosed in the prospectuses of Greek 
IPOs provide reliable information. The Athens Stock Exchange made a good decision by changing the 
regulations from mandatory to voluntary earnings disclosure as we have seen a reduction in the level of 
absolute forecast error. Market makers should encourage newly listed companies to provide earnings 
forecast information in their prospectuses as voluntary disclosure contributes to the transparency of 
market operation and minimizes information asymmetry.  
 
 
References 
 
Abarbanell, J., R. Lehavy. 2003. Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of earnings management in 
explaining apparent optimism and inefficiency in analysts' earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 36 105-146. 
Allen, A., Y. Cho, J. Kooyul. 1997. Earnings forecast errors: Comparative evidence from the Pacific-Basin capital 
market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 5 115-129. 
Baber, W., S. Chen, S.H. Kang. 2006. Stock price reaction to evidence of earnings management: Implications for 
supplementary financial disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 11 5-19. 
Babich, V., M.J. Sobel, 2004. Pre-IPO Operational and Financial Decisions. Management Sci. 50, 935-948. 
Ball, R., L. Shivakumar, 2008. Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 
324–349. 
Beatty, R. 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of IPO's. Accounting Review 64 693-709. 
31 
 
Beatty, R., J. Ritter. 1986. Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal 
of Financial Economics 15 213-232. 
Brown, P., G. Richardson, J. Schwager. 1987. An information interpretation of financial analyst superiority in 
forecasting earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 15 49-67. 
Cazavan-Jeny, A., T. Jeanjean. 2007. Levels of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectuses: An empirical analysis. 
Review of Accounting and Finance 6 131-149. 
Chan, A, S. Cora, T. Millie, D. Wong, R. Chan. 1996. Possible factors of the accuracy of prospectus earnings 
forecasts in Hong Kong. International Journal of Accounting 31 381-398. 
Chapman, C.J., T.J. Steenburgh. 2011. An investigation of earnings management through marketing actions, 
Management Sci. 57 72-92. 
Chen, G., M. Firth. 1999. The accuracy of profit forecasts and their roles and associations with IPO firm valuations. 
Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 10 202-226. 
Chen, G., M. Firth, G. Krishnan. 2001. Earnings forecast errors in IPO prospectuses and their associations with 
initial stock returns. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 11 225-240. 
Cheng, T., M. Firth. 2000. An empirical analysis of the bias and rationality of profit forecasts published in new issue 
prospectuses. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 27 423-446. 
Chi, J., M. Gupta. 2009. Overvaluation and earnings management. Journal of Banking and Finance 33 1652-1663  
Clarkson, P., A. Donoth, G. Richardson, S. Sefcik. 1992. The voluntary inclusion of earnings forecasts in IPO 
prospectuses. Contemporary Accounting Research 8 601-626. 
Clarkson, P., D. Simunic. 1994. The association between audit quality, retained ownership, and firm-specific risk in 
U.S. vs. Canadian IPO markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 207-228. 
Cormier, D., I. Martinez. 2006. The association between management earnings forecasts, earnings management, and 
stock market valuation: Evidence from French IPOs. International Journal of Accounting 41 209-236. 
Datar, S., G. Feltham, T. Hughes. 1991. The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 14(1) 3-50. 
Firth, M., 1998. IPO profits forecasts and their role in signalling firm value and explaining post-listing returns. 
Applied Financial Economics 8 29-39. 
Firth, M., M. Gift. 1999. An international comparison of analysis' earnings forecast accuracy. International 
Advances in Economic Research 5 56-64. 
Firth, M., B. Kwok, C. Liau-Tan, G. Yeo. 1995. Accuracy of profit forecasts in IPO prospectus. Accounting and 
Business Review 2, 55-83. 
Firth, M., R. Lonkani. 2005. The accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts in Thailand and their relationships with stock 
market valuation. Accounting and Business Research 35 (3) 269-286. 
Firth, M., A. Smith. 1992. The accuracy of profits forecasts in initial public offerings prospectuses. Accounting and 
Business Research 22 239-247. 
Fischer, P., P.  Stocken. 2004. Effect of investor speculation on earnings management. Journal of Accounting 
Research 42 (5) 843-870. 
Ghicas, D., N. Iriotis, A. Papadaki, M. Walker. 2000. Fundamental analysis and the valuation of IPO's in the 
construction industry. International Journal of Accounting 35 227-241. 
Ghikas, D., A. Papadaki, G. Siougle, and T. Sougiannis, 2008. The Relevance of quantifiable audit qualifications in 
the valuation of IPOs. Review of Accounting Studies 13 512-550. 
Gupta, M., I. Khurana, R.  Pereira. 2008. Legal enforcement, short maturity debt, and the incentive to manage 
earnings. Journal of Law and Economics 51 619–639. 
Hartnett, N., and J. Romcke. 2000. The predictability of management forecast error: A study of Australian IPO 
disclosure. Multinational Finance Journal 4 101-132. 
Healy, P.M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earning management literature and its implication for 
standard and setting. Accounting Horizons 13 365-383. 
Hughes, P. 1986. Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 8 199-242. 
Hutton, A., G. Miller, D. Skinner. 2003. The role of supplementary statements with management earnings forecast. 
Journal of Accounting Research 41 867-890  
Jaggi, B. 1980. Further evidence on the accuracy of management forecasts vis-a-vis analysts forecasts. The 
Accounting Review 55 96-101. 
Jaggi, B. 1997. Accuracy of forecast information disclosed in the IPO prospectuses of Hong Kong companies. 
International Journal of Accounting 32 301-319. 
32 
 
Jelic, R., B. Saadouni, R. Briston. 1998. The accuracy of earnings forecast in IPO prospectuses on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange 1984-1995. Accounting and Business Research 29 57-72. 
Jog, V., B. McConomy. 2003. Voluntary disclosures of management earnings forecast in IPOs and the impact on 
underpricing and post - issue return performance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 30 125-167. 
Kao, J., D. Wu, Z. Yang. 2009. Regulations earnings management, and post-IPO performance: The Chinese 
evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 33 63-76. 
Keasey, K., P. McGuiness. 1991. Prospectus earning forecasts and the pricing of new issue on the unlisted securities 
market. Accounting and Business Research 21 133-145. 
Keasey, K., P. McGuiness. 2008. Firm value and its relation to equity retention levels, forecast earnings disclosures 
and underpricing initial public offerings in Hong Kong. International Business Review 17 642-662. 
Lee, I., N. Taylor, C. Yee, M. Yee, 1993. Prospectus forecast earning: evidence and explanations Australia. 
Australian Accounting Review 3 21-32. 
Leone, A., S. Rock, M. Willenborg. 2007. Disclosure of Intended Use of Proceeds and Underpricing in Initial Public 
Offerings. Journal of Accounting Research 45 1081-1114. 
Leuz, C., D.  Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: an international 
comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69 505-527. 
Li, Y., and B. McConomy. 2004. Simultaneous signaling in IPOs via management earnings forecasts and retained 
ownership: An empirical analysis of the substitution effect. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. 
19 1-28. 
Mak, Y. 1989. The determinants of accuracy of management earning forecast: A New Zealand study. International 
Journal of Accounting 24, 267-280. 
Mak, Y. 1994. The voluntary review of earnings forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy 13 141-158. 
McGuinness, P. B. 2005. A re-examination of the disclosure of discretionary earnings forecasts: The case of initial 
public offerings in Hong Kong. Quarterly Bulletin, Summer 10–31. 
McNichols, M., P. O'Brien. 1997. Self selection and analyst coverage. Journal of Accounting Research 35 167-199. 
Pedwell, K., H. Warsame, D. Neu. 1994. The accuracy of Canadian and New Zealand's earnings forecasts: a 
comparison of voluntary vs compulsory disclosures. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation 3 221-236. 
Pownall, G., C. Wasley, G. Waymire. 1989. Alternative forms of management earnings forecasts: Incidence and 
stock prices effects. Accounting Review 68 896-912. 
Ritter, J., I. Welch. 2002. A review of IPO activities, pricing and allocation. Journal of Finance 57 1795-1828. 
Roosenboom, P., T. van der Goot, G. Mertens. 2003. Earnings management and initial public offerings: Evidence 
from the Netherlands. International Journal of Accounting 38 243-266. 
Ruland, W., S. Tung, and N. George, 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers forecast. Accounting 
Review 65 710-721. 
Siougle, G. 2007. Accounting information and the valuation of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), International 
Journal of Accounting 42 380-395. 
Teoh, S., T. Wong, G. Rao. 1998. Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic?, Review of 
Accounting Studies 3 175-208. 
 
